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Abstract. Quantum systems show contextuality. More precisely, it is impossible to reproduce the
quantum-mechanical predictions using a non-contextual realist model, i.e., a model where the out-
come of one measurement is independent of the choice of compatible measurements performed
in the measurement context. There has been several attempts to quantify the amount of contextu-
ality for specific quantum systems, for example, in the number of rays needed in a KS proof, or
the number of terms in certain inequalities, or in the violation, noise sensitivity, and other mea-
sures. This paper is about another approach: to use a simple contextual model that reproduces the
quantum-mechanical contextual behaviour, but not necessarily all quantum predictions. The amount
of contextuality can then be quantified in terms of additional resources needed as compared with
a similar model without contextuality. In this case the contextual model needs to keep track of the
context used, so the appropriate measure would be memory. Another way to view this is as a mem-
ory requirement to be able to reproduce quantum contextuality in a realist model. The model we will
use can be viewed as an extension of Spekkens’ toy model [Phys. Rev. A 75, 032110 (2007)], and
the relation is studied in some detail. To reproduce the quantum predictions for the Peres-Mermin
square, the memory requirement is more than one bit in addition to the memory used for the indi-
vidual outcomes in the corresponding noncontextual model.
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INTRODUCTION
In this short paper we will see an example of how a noncontextual model, that attempts
to emulate quantum mechanics, is modified into a contextual model. The larger and
more fundamental question [1]: “Can the quantum-mechanical description be consid-
ered complete?” concerns the possibility to augment quantum mechanics (QM) with
additional hidden variables (HVs) that provide a more detailed, more complete descrip-
tion (see also [2, 3]). Attempts to construct such HV models include ones where, for
a given experiment, the observed probability distributions are used as a HV model [4].
Moreover, there are explicit HV theories, such as Bohmian mechanics [5, 6], which can
reproduce all experiments up to date. However, these models use properties that make
them less general (using a fundamentally different model for each experimental setup)
or undesirable in other ways (superluminal influence). Therefore, we need to make addi-
tional assumptions about the structure of the HV model, to avoid this. The most famous
result in this direction is Bell’s theorem [7], stating that local HV models cannot repro-
duce the QM correlations between local measurements on some entangled states. That
particular set of additional assumptions will not be studied further in this paper but we
note that this conflict can be tested in experiment [8–10].
A second seminal result on HV models reproducing QM predictions is the Kochen-
Specker (KS) theorem [11–13]. This result concerns so-called noncontextual HV mod-
els, in which measurement outcomes do not depend on which other compatible mea-
surements are (have been) performed. There have been several proposals to test the KS
theorem in experiment [14–22], but there is also a discussion whether the KS theorem
can be experimentally tested at all [23–34]. We will leave that discussion here, and
concentrate on one specific noncontextual model, Spekkens’ toy model [35], which is
known to possess certain QM features but lack others, in particular contextuality. This
paper is concerned with an attempt to add contextuality to this model, to make it closer
to QM, and analyses the cost of this addition. We will see that the price is to be paid
in the form of a larger ontic state space and a more complicated set of rules that gov-
ern state changes caused by measurement. The paper starts with a brief description of
the system used and the contextuality property of this QM system, and proceeds with a
description of Spekkens’ toy model and the addition needed to make it contextual.
A QUANTUM SYSTEM AND ITS CONTEXTUALITY
In this paper, we are going to use a two-qubit system, and measurements on it. When
studying questions about local hidden variable models, it is common to assume that the
system is in a specific (entangled) state, say the singlet state. Here, we are not going to
assume that the system is in such a state, in fact, what follows will be valid even if the
state is completely mixed.
We will be concerned with measurement outcomes, and what can be expected to
influence these measurement outcomes. Each subsystem can be measured upon by
checking whether the “spin of the particle1” is up or down in one of the axis directions.
In quantum-mechanical terms, our four possible measurement choices (of observables)
for each subsystem is I, σx, σy, or σz, and these do not commute; for each subsystem
we must make one of the four choices. We denote the outcomes +1 for “up” and −1 for
“down”. We note that there is a difference between doing a separate measurement of σx
on the two subsystems, and doing a joint measurement of the product of σx on both. The
first corresponds to using the operators σx⊗I, and I⊗σx, while the second corresponds
to the single operator σx⊗σx, which only outputs one bit of information. We usually
assume that this is the sign of the product of the previous outcomes, but one needs to be
aware that even this innocuous statement is one of noncontextuality: we assume that the
“spin of the first particle along the x-axis” is the same whether we jointly measure the
“spin of the second particle along the x-axis” or not.
This is really based in our classical intuition, and the same (noncontextual) reasoning
implies that the outcome for one subsystem is independent of measurement choice for
the second subsystem. Using classical intuition we expect that the result of measurement
of σx⊗ I, should be independent of the choice between I⊗ σx, I⊗ σy, or I⊗ σz, as
a measurement on the second subsystem. This classical intuition underlies the notion
1 Classical intuition translates the systems’ particle-like behaviour into the belief that we are using
particles as our systems. This is not true here, but the present discussion will side-step this important
issue. Already spin-1/2 properties are difficult enough, so we will not discuss the more complex issues of
position and momentum as properties.
of noncontextuality: The outcome of the measurement of one observable should not
be influenced by which simultaneous measurement is performed, which commuting
observable that is measured. The two outcomes may be dependent, but the outcome
of the first measurement not be influenced by the choice of second measurement.
Perhaps it is in place to stress the connection to counterfactual reasoning: we are
saying that “I have measured σx⊗ I and I⊗σx, but a noncontextual model would have
given the same outcome for the first in the pair if I instead would have measured σx⊗ I
and I⊗σz”. A classical system could be expected to obey this, but as we shall see, a
quantum system does not.
In this system, one can form the following square of nine observables, also known as
the Peres-Mermin (PM) square [36, 37]


σz⊗ I I⊗σz σz⊗σz
I⊗σx σx⊗ I σx⊗σx
σz⊗σx σx⊗σz σy⊗σy


.
The square is constructed such that the observables within each row and column com-
mute, corresponding to compatible measurement, and the product of the operators in any
row or column yields I, except for the last column, where
(σz⊗σz)(σx⊗σx)(σy⊗σy) =−I.
In a noncontextual model, the measurement outcomes for each individual measurement
would not depend on the choice of compatible measurement from the same row or
column. A noncontextual model of our system (containing our two subsystems) would
therefore assign ±1 values to the outcomes within the matrix, and the products of these
values should follow the same rules: the products of the values in any row or column
should be +1, except for the last column where the product should be −1. But this
is impossible. Under the QM rule, multiplying the six row and column products would
give the value−1, but in our noncontextual model, each individual value appears exactly
twice (once in each row and once in each column) so that the total product must equal
+1 (being a product of squares). Therefore, a noncontextual model must have an even
number of −1s in the row and column products, while QM predicts an odd number of
−1s. A noncontextual model cannot obey the QM predictions.
SPEKKENS’ TOY MODEL
We will now briefly shift our focus to one explicit noncontextual model that is specif-
ically designed to mimic QM. It has some of the properties of QM but lacks others.
We will just look at the basic construction here, for those interested I would recommend
reading [35] and references therein. The toy theory is built on the following foundational
principle (The knowledge balance principle):
If one has maximal knowledge, then for every system, at every time, the
amount of knowledge one possesses about the ontic state of the system at
that time must equal the amount of knowledge one lacks [35].
The model is constructed to mimic QM, so in its simplest form, we want to construct
the equivalent of a qubit. A qubit measurement has two outcomes, which by the knowl-
edge balance principle means that the ontic state space of a toy bit has four states. The
ontic state space can be graphically represented as
,
where the ontic state is the second of the four possible. In general, a state can be a
statistical mix of these ontic states.
Our measurement can, at the most, identify two out of these four ontic states and
say: “the system is in one of these two states” (as opposed to being in one of the
other two states). Statements like this identify the epistemic states (the experimentally
available outcomes) of the system. There are six combinations of two ontic states, six
epistemic states. These naturally form three pairs that can be identified with the three
spin-measurement axes X Y Z
+1
−1
.
For a system in the ontic state depicted above, a measurement of “the spin along
the x-axis” would give the outcome +1, because the ontic state is contained in the
corresponding epistemic state. A subsequent measurement of “the spin along the y-
axis” would identify the ontic state completely unless the measurement procedure is
allowed to influence the state. Therefore, the knowledge balance principle forces the
model to include a state change after measurement. The model is such that the ontic
state is randomised after measurement between the two possibilities in the epistemic
state. This removes the possibility to extract more information about the ontic state than
the knowledge balance principle allows. In this manner, the knowledge balance principle
mimics the uncertainty principle from QM.
Having presented the single system construction, we will now quickly review the
combination of two such systems into a two-toy-bit model. The ontic state space now
has sixteen points, and a specific ontic state can be graphically represented as
.
We can maximally extract two bits of knowledge from this system, and the knowledge
balance principle gives us many epistemic states, for example
X1 = X2 =+1 Y1 = Y2 =+1 X1 = X2,Y1 = Y2,Z1 = Z2 X1 =−Z2,Y1 = X2,Z1 = Y2
.
A measurement determining which epistemic state the system is in again randomises
between the four ontic states contained in the epistemic state. Note that not all combi-
nations of four ontic states are allowed as epistemic states, again for details, see [35].
This is sufficiently close to two-qubit systems in QM to give several behaviours that
can be used to mimic quantum-like behaviour. A partial list would include Noncom-
mutativity (uncertainty), Interference, Remote steering, No cloning, No broadcasting,
Mutually Unbiased Partitions, Dense coding, Entanglement monogamy, Teleportation,
Positive Operator Valued Measures, . . . .
A subsystem measurement on a two-toy-bit model would extract less than maximal
information, and the corresponding epistemic states contain eight ontic states. The ontic
state of the measured subsystem is randomised, while the ontic state of the unmeasured
subsystem is not. In fact, whenever nonmaximal information is extracted, the ontic state
is not maximally randomised within the epistemic state, but it is easiest to understand in
the example of a subsystem measurement, as in
Z1 =+1
→ or
.
An example of a protocol that uses a two-qu/toy-bit system and performs transforma-
tions on one subsystem by itself is dense coding; we can observe that the ontic state
space of a one-toy-bit subsystem contains exactly four states, which is just enough to
allow for dense coding.
However, not all QM behaviour is captured. The most important missing features are
Contextuality, Nonlocality, Continuum of states, Two levels of a three-level system is not
a two-level system, “Quantum” computational speedup, . . . ; we will concentrate on the
first item. It is simple to see that the model is noncontextual, because the measurement
procedure is such that an outcome of a joint measurement outcome is given by the
product of the individual outcomes. Our example ontic state would give the following
results:
X1 =+1 Z2 =−1 X1 =+1,Z2 =−1 X1Z2 =−1
.
The measurement outcome X1Z2 = −1 is one of the outcomes of the PM square, when
used on the toy model. For this particular ontic state, writing out all the combinations
results in 

Z1 Z2 Z1Z2
X2 X1 X1X2
Z1X2 X1Z2 Y1Y2

=


+1 −1 −1
+1 +1 +1
+1 −1 −1


.
Writing out the signs contained in the PM square for each of the ontic states results in
+++
+++
+++
−+−
+++
−+−
−+−
+−−
−−+
+++
+−−
+−−
+−−
+++
+−−
−−+
+++
−−+
−−+
+−−
−+−
+−−
+−−
+++
+−−
−+−
−−+
−−+
−+−
+−−
−−+
−−+
+++
+−−
−−+
−+−
+++
−+−
−+−
−+−
−+−
+++
−+−
−−+
+−−
+++
−−+
−−+
.
Here, all rows and columns have the product +1, so that the ontic states can be indexed
by the top left four signs of the PM-square values. Also, the last column does not fulfil
the QM prediction, a product equal to −1.
This can be viewed as a “finite state machine” (specifically, a “stochastic Mealy
machine”) as follows: each ontic state is one of the sixteen possible states of the machine.
When a measurement is performed, the machine outputs a ±1 value that depends on its
ontic state and the chosen measurement (the “input” to the machine), and then changes
state. In the toy model this state change is to a random ontic state within the epistemic
state. Below you can see an example, where the large discs are two (ontic) states of
the finite state machine and the arrows are state transitions. We start in the left ontic
state, perform a measurement of Z1 which outputs +1 and changes state randomly to
either the same state or a new state with opposite values assigned to the non-commuting
observables. The contradiction to the QM prediction is indicated with a dotted ellipse,
+++
+++
+++
+++
+−−
+−−Z1 meas.
prob. 1/2
Z1 meas.
prob. 1/2
Z1 outcome
.
This description is mathematically equivalent to the previous. Of course, the above
diagram is only a small part of the state space and transitions, since there are sixteen
different ontic states and nine possible measurement choices, all corresponding to a
different network of state transitions. Using the language of finite state machines, we
can now add properties to the model that were previously difficult to conceptualise.
One less desirable effect is that the epistemic states are more difficult to present within
the description. But, since our aim is to add properties, we will use the state machine
formalism below.
ADDING CONTEXTUALITY TO THE TOY MODEL
We now want to extend the model so that it gives the QM predictions, including the PM
square results. For brevity, we will restrict ourselves to sequential measurements [38],
and a more complete presentation of the procedure can be found in [39]. To extend the
model properly, we will need to add (ontic) states to the finite state machine. The basic
questions are what states we add, how many, and if there is a minimal extension. The
leftmost state below is already present, and the two others are example states that are
possible to add:
+++
+++
+++
+++
+++
++−
+++
+++
+−−
.
Our starting point will be Spekkens’ model, where state transitions always keep the
values assigned to commuting observables constant, and randomise the values assigned
to non-commuting observables. Our new larger model cannot obey this strictly (although
it will preserve the value assigned to the measured observable). This is because of our
desire to reproduce the QM predictions for the last column. To do this, some transitions
induced by measurement in the last column must change one of the values in the column.
Indeed, this transition must go to a state for which the rightmost column product is−1, as
in the below example (we will suppress the randomisation of values of non-commuting
observables in what follows)
+++
+++
+++
+
+
−
Z1Z2 meas.
.
Thus, we will need to add ontic states of the type indicated above. However, it turns
out that one transition of this type from the rightmost column is not enough. If, in the
above example, we were to perform measurements of the right column observables in
the order from the bottom one to the top one, the state change is too late to stop us from
finding the column product +1. Therefore, at least two measurements in the column
must give rise to state transitions, both leading to a state with no contradiction in the last
column (but a contradiction elsewhere)
+++
+++
+++
+
+
−
Z1Z2 =+1
X1X2 =+1 .
Furthermore, the two transitions must go to different states, because otherwise we will
find the column product +1 since the state transition must preserve the value assigned
to the measured observable (again, this can be demonstrated by measuring in the order
from bottom to top above).
+++
+++
+++
+
−
+
−
+
+
Z1Z2 =
+1
X1X2 =+1
.
There are now a few alternatives on how to continue to fill in values in the new states.
Note that each ontic state still needs to have an even number of −1 row and column
products (an assignment of outcomes in a single ontic state must be noncontextual).
Therefore, we also need to decide where the −1 product should go among the five
alternatives. Some alternatives can be ruled out by using appropriate sequences of
measurement choices, but the somewhat tedious procedure [39] will not be repeated
here. As it turns out, there is a model with four states that reproduces the QM predictions
for the PM square (in the sense that the products are the expected ones)
+++
+++
+++
+++
−+−
−++
+−−
+++
+−+
+−−
−+−
−−+
Z1Z2 =
+1
X1X2 =+1
Z1X2 =−1X1Z2 =−1
Z1X2 =+1 X1Z2
=−
1
Z1Z2
=−
1
X1X2 =−1
.
We have added three ontic states to the one we started with, so it is tempting to
conclude that the model would need 64 ontic states instead of 16. But a close inspection
reveals that the rightmost state above already is present in Spekkens’ original model.
Further, the two middle states both have their contradiction in the last row, and form a
similar class of ontic states. Thus, we only need to add 16 states to Spekkens’ model.
Our new ontic state space can be depicted by repeating the original table beside another
where the bottom right sign has been inverted. The above four-state machine has also
been delineated below.
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+++
−+−
+++
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−+−
+−−
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+++
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+−−
+−−
+++
+−−
−−+
+++
−−+
−−+
+−−
−+−
+−−
+−−
+++
+−−
−+−
−−+
−−+
−+−
+−−
−−+
−−+
+++
+−−
−−+
−+−
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+++
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−++
+−−
+−−
++−
+−−
−+−
−−−
−−+
−+−
+−+
−−+
−−+
++−
+−−
−−+
−++
+++
−+−
−++
−+−
−+−
++−
−+−
−−+
+−+
+++
−−+
−−−
.
It is a simple matter to include the randomisation of the non-compatible measurement
outcomes, but we will skip the details in this short note.
CONCLUSIONS
Quantum Contextuality is one of the more puzzling properties of QM, so any tool that
helps us understand contextuality, ultimately helps us to understand QM. Spekkens’
toy model is helpful in many ways because it provides a middle ground where we
can describe and discuss many of the phenomena associated with QM and Quantum
Information Theory, without going to the full-blown QM formalism.
This paper attempts to extend this middle ground to include quantum contextuality
into the description and discussion. Using the language of finite state machines, we have
successfully included quantum-contextual behaviour. The present note is limited to the
case of sequential measurements on pairs of “toy” bits (resembling qubits), and restricts
the measurement choices to (the equivalent of) “spin measurements” along two axes.
Unfortunately, the lacking third axis means that the model is incomplete, and it seems
that the state space needs to be extended even further to incorporate this [39]. Adding a
third measurement also adds many relations between the available measurement choices,
and results in ten different PM squares [40], instead of one.
Nevertheless, we have seen how to extend Spekkens’ toy model to include two more
items in the list of quantum-like behaviours that it mimics: Contextuality, and Nonlocal-
ity. The latter is included because a two-toy-bit system with separated subsystems would
need nonlocal influence to show the needed behaviour: both measurement choices are
needed to determine the state transition in the model. One property that is certainly still
missing is a continuum of states, but we have yet to see whether two levels of a three-
level system is a two level system or not. We we have not yet seen the three-level version
of this new model, so we have nothing to compare with. The possibility of a “Quantum”
computational speedup is also still open.
There is a price to pay for this extension, however: the knowledge balance principle
fails. There are more than twice as many ontic states as there are epistemic states. Mea-
sured in (ordinary) bits of information, the model uses one additional bit of information
that keeps track of where the contradiction is in the PM square (last row or last column),
and this bit is not accessible to the experimentalist. One way of interpreting this is that
the system keeps an internal memory of what the experimenter previously has done to
the system. This one bit of information can be proved to be a lower bound for models
that obey the QM predictions [39]. Thus, a contextual HV model that gives the QM
predictions must obey a knowledge imbalance principle:
If one has maximal knowledge, then for every system, at every time, the
amount of knowledge one possesses about the ontic state of the system at
that time cannot exceed the amount of knowledge one lacks.
It is the author’s firm belief that quantum contextuality is the main cause of the diffi-
culty of understanding QM, and that it plays an important role in Quantum Information
Theory. This note (and [39]) provides a link between information theoretical concepts on
the one side and quantum contextuality and the Kochen-Specker theorem on the other.
There is a definite need to explore the connection further.
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